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Abstract
This article analyses the roles played by patronage and brokerage in an Indonesian
district election by focusing on variation in village-level results. Through interviews
with village elites, we found that highly uneven village voting patterns were strongly
influenced by varying patterns of patronage distribution. The winning candidate (the
son of the incumbent) used a state-centred form of patronage involving pork barrel
and club goods that provedmore effective than gifts distributed through social, specif-
ically religious, networks. Also critical were effective and trustworthy community-level
brokers to deliver patronage, with retail vote-buying especially vulnerable to broker
predation. Among the four categories of brokers we identified, state brokers—notably
village heads—were especially effective at marshalling votes. Our findings underline
the importance of patronage in Indonesian elections and the centrality of brokers in
clientelistic systemsgenerally. They alsohelp explain thedominationof formerbureau-
crats in electoral contests in regional Indonesia.
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It has become a widely accepted observation, almost a truism, in the study
of contemporary Indonesia that patronage—cash, goods, jobs, contracts, or
other material benefits distributed in exchange for political support—is the
glue that holds the political system together. Patronage, it is also widely agreed,
is particularly important in local elections. But how do we move beyond such
general observations tomoreprecise judgements? For example, are some forms
of patronage more effective than others, and under what circumstances? And
howdoweaccount for the significant variations in results that candidates using
patronage strategies can obtain across geographic locations? This article pro-
poses one novel approach to begin answering such questions by presenting the
results of a meso-level study of village election results and patronage networks
in South Kalimantan Province. Rather than focusing on themacro level of can-
didates and their strategies, or the micro level of individual voters, our focus
is instead on the connective tissue that lies between the two. That connective
tissue is to be found in the communities where voters live.
Accordingly, we sent a team of researchers to three dozen villages in the
district of Tanah Laut (Map 1), not long after it had carried out a bupati (district
head) election in 2013.Our teammembers interviewed village elites aboutwhat
factors had influenced the election results in their communities. Although
our questions were open-ended and we were interested in any strategies the
candidates might have used, we particularly focused on their patronage and
networking efforts. We tried, in other words, an approach that is simple yet
surprisingly rarely used in research on patronage politics in Indonesia and
more generally: we endeavoured to determine to what extent variation in
election results was a consequence of varying patterns in patronage delivery.
We focused on the intermediate level of the villages, in part precisely because
it is relatively straightforward to identify variation in election results at this
level. Indeed, the electoral map of Tanah Laut District resembled a patchwork
(seemaps 2 and 3) in which even neighbouring villages recorded very different
results despite having similar socio-economic and cultural profiles. We were
also interested in this meso level for a theoretical reason: our understanding of
patronage delivery suggests that it is mid-level brokers who play a critical role
in ensuring effective delivery of patronage to voters around elections, and in
ensuring that recipients reciprocate with their votes. Put simply: no brokers,
no patronage.
Although, aswith anymethod, this onehad its limitations,we arrived at find-
ings that contribute significantly to existing literature on patronage politics in
Indonesia. Four findings stand out. The first two concern patronage, which we
define, following Shefter (1994:283 n. 3; see also Hutchcroft 2013) as ‘a divisi-
ble benefit that politicians distribute to individual voters, campaign workers,
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or contributors in exchange for political support’. First, our study confirms that
patronage can indeed count a great deal in Indonesian elections, andnot just in
a general sense but also in producing varied voting results. We found evidence
of recent patronage delivery by candidates in all but one of the villages that
comprised our case studies, and bymultiple candidates in 30 of the 36 villages.
In the only village where there was no evidence of recent patronage delivery,
the candidate who won there promised a future pork-barrel project should he
be elected. Perhaps most dramatically of all, we found evidence of patronage
delivery by the candidate who achieved the highest vote in the village con-
cerned in 34 of the 36 villages, showing a high correlation between patronage
delivery and electoral victory. These findings provide a degree of empirical evi-
dence of patronage that is largely missing from the more anecdotal accounts
that predominate in existing literature on Indonesian local politics.
Second, we found that not all forms of patronage counted in the sameway or
to the same degree. In particular, pork barrel projects and club goods delivered
through the lowest level of the government apparatus had greater impact than
the othermethodswe identified as being common—individual and club goods
provided through social networks (notably religious organizations) and retail
vote-buying (though for reasons we explain below we are less confident of our
findings in regard to vote-buying).
Our next findings concern brokerage. The third finding is that while patron-
age mattered, so too did the brokers by whom it was delivered. The patchwork
of election results in the district not only mapped closely onto candidates’
patronage delivery at the village level, but also onto their ability to recruit effec-
tive and reliable brokers there. Vote-buying efforts were especially prone to
failure if poor-quality brokers were recruited. Fourth, it was not only the relia-
bility of individual voters that mattered, but their type, too. We identified four
categories of brokers as having played a role in this election (party, state, com-
munity, and market), but found that it was the state brokers whose access to
patronage was connected to their occupancy of low-level positions in the state
structure—notably village heads—who were most prominent in determining
the election’s outcomes. Taken together with our finding about the efficacy of
state-centred patronage, our findings point toward the techniques of power
maintenance that bureaucratic actors use to entrench themselves in local pol-
itics in Indonesia.
We present these findings and arguments in several sections. First, we locate
our study in the context of existing literature on local electoral politics in
Indonesia and on brokerage as it pertains to the study of patronage. Second,
we provide a background to the election in Tanah Laut. In a third section, we
begin to describe our empirical findings by outlining the state-centred club
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goods and pork barrel projects that were decisive in this election. Fourth, we
investigate a category of patronage that has been much remarked upon in
the Indonesia literature and that was common in Tanah Laut: collective and
individual gifts distributed through social networks, specifically grass-roots
religious organizations. Fifth, we evaluate the role of retail vote-buying in
this election, noting how patchy this method was and how vulnerable it was
to broker betrayal. Sixth, we investigate the role of brokers in the election,
emphasizing their centrality in determining smooth patronage delivery and
thus influencing electoral outcomes. In a final section, we return to our major
findings and highlight implications of the study for future research.
Locating the Research Empirically and Theoretically
In thewake of the post-Suharto twin transitions of democratization and decen-
tralization, over the last decade and a half literature on local politics in Indone-
sia has greatly expanded (for book-length overviews, see Aspinall and Fealy
2003; Choi 2011; Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009; Hadiz 2010; Schulte Nordholt and
Van Klinken 2007). Early on, a major concern was identifying the sociopolit-
ical backgrounds of the politicians who were winning competitions for local
office, especially as governors of provinces, bupati (heads of districts), and
walikota (mayors of cities), at first via indirect elections in local parliaments
and, from 2005, through direct elections of regional government heads, or
pilkada. Scholars wanted to ascertain whether democratization was reconsti-
tuting local elites and allowing access to new entrants, especially those repre-
senting formerly marginalized groups. From early on, studies established that
this was not generally the case, but often with rather broad brush strokes. Typ-
ical was Hadiz’s (2004:711) conclusion that ‘the decentralization process has
been effectively captured by predatory interests’ which had been ‘nurtured
under the Soeharto regime’s formerly vast, centralized system of patronage’
(see also Choi 2011:14–5). More recently, such findings have been amended by
scholars pointing to growing pluralism in local elites (Choi 2014). Others have
teased apart the catch-all category of ‘elites’ to identify which subgroups are
particularly dominant in local politics. A critical finding here, relevant for our
analysis of Tanah Laut, is that a high proportion of aspirants for political office
in the regions have backgrounds in the state bureaucracy (Buehler 2010:275,
2013; Mietzner 2010:178).
Having established the elite backgrounds of local powerholders and aspi-
rants, scholars have also turned their attention to the power resources that
candidates mobilize, and their connections to circuits of financial and bureau-
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cratic power. Although much of this literature uses the indigenous Indonesian
term ‘money politics’, scholars oftenmention patronage distribution strategies
such as vote-buying and distribution of club goods, though usually in pass-
ing or anecdotally in local case studies focusing on other issues (for instance,
Hidayat 2009:129–32; Hadiz 2010:120–33). Even so, some scholars have drawn
on such studies to argue that patronage is a defining feature of local politics
(for instance, Van Klinken 2009; Aspinall 2013). Another strong finding is that
political parties often play a relatively marginal role in organizing local elec-
toral contests (for instance, Buehler 2009; Mietzner 2010:177–8; Tomsa 2009)
and that personal networks are instead often central. In one widely cited
study from South Sulawesi, for example, Buehler and Tan (2007:58) pointed
to ‘efforts of power brokers—such as religious figures, large landholders, and
bureaucrats—who could lobby in the subdistricts and who often distributed
goods to the people’. In short, scholars have frequently identified patronage
and brokerage as being critical to Indonesian local politics, even if they do not
always explicitly connect their analyses to comparative literature on such top-
ics.
Much of this literature has been produced by scholars favouring case study
research, where the unit of analysis is a particular electoral contest and where
the researcher uses elite interviews, media analysis, ethnographic methods,
and similar techniques tomap the power resources and strategies used by can-
didates (see for instance various chapters in Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009). Often
scholars conduct more than one such study to identify common patterns (for
instance, Choi 2011), or to identify different modes of campaigning (one excel-
lent example is Tans 2012). While this research has produced rich findings, and
identified important shared features of local politics (for instance, ‘patronage
is important’), it has been less effective at testing more specific propositions
(for instance, ‘under what conditions is patronage important?’). This article
presents one attempt—thoughwe stressmany othermethods are possible—to
move this research agenda forward.
In our research in Tanah Laut, we were fundamentally interested in exam-
ining the extent to which patronage swayed voter choices in the villages we
studied. Additionally, we were motivated by two main lines of inquiry. First,
are some forms of patronage more common—and more effective—than oth-
ers, and under what conditions? Patronage, defined above as divisible benefits
distributed in exchange for political support, comes in different forms. Let us
mention three varieties that are common in electoral mobilization in Indone-
sia (Aspinall 2014a) and which, as we shall see, featured in Tanah Laut. Pork
barrel projects (Stokes et al. 2013:12) are geographically targeted programmes
designed to persuade the residents of a particular locale to support a party
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or candidate, or to reward them for having done so (in Indonesia they often
take the form of road, bridge, or similar construction projects). Club goods
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007:11) are also for collective benefit, but recipients
are not defined geographically but by membership of a formal or informal
organization (a prayer group, a sports club, a youth organization, et cetera).
Vote-buying (Schaffer 2007) entails the gifting of goods or cash to individuals,
in exchange for their votes. Each method has costs and benefits for politicians,
most of which relate to the critical questions of reciprocity and contingency,
which lie at the heart of clientelistic exchange (Hicken 2011:291–2; Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007:10–2): politicians hope or expect that voters will repay
them for the benefits they hand out, but it can be very difficult to enforce this
exchange. For example, club goods can raise problems of free riding—a ben-
eficiary group may receive a collective gift from a politician, but some or all
of its members may not feel obliged to repay the politician with their votes
if, for example, they receive individual cash payments from a rival. On the
other hand, individual vote-buying is notoriously difficult to enforce if the bal-
lot is truly secret (Schaffer and Schedler 2007). Different sorts of patronage will
thus typically require different sorts of brokers to facilitate and monitor these
exchanges.
This brings us to our third question: Are some brokers more important, and
more effective, than others? Because patronage involves exchange, patronage
politicians require intermediaries between them and voters in order to deter-
mine voters’ preferences, deliver the benefits, and to enforce or encourage
compliance with ‘the deal’ (Chattharakul 2010; Krishna 2007; Stokes et al. 2013;
Wang and Kurzman 2007). Although the role of intermediaries has long been
stressed in literature on clientelism, earlier works tended to stress the hierar-
chical nature of clientelistic relationships and, especially, the dependence of
clients on patrons in the context of relatively stable agrarian societies (Scott
1972). Much of the new literature emphasizes the independent agency of bro-
kers and their capacity for preferences that diverge from their patrons, for
example whenmisdirecting or expropriating part of the cash or goods they are
supposed to distribute to voters (Stokes et al. 2013:20; Kitschelt and Wilkinson
2007:8). Brokers may be critical to patronage politics, but they can also sab-
otage it. Aspinall (2014b) discusses this proposition with regard to Indonesia,
highlighting the role of ‘opportunist brokers’ whose primary goal is to benefit
materially from a political campaign.
In much of the comparative literature on clientelism, especially that draw-
ing on Latin American cases, brokers are assumed to be party workers (see,
for example, Stokes et al. 2013:19). However, as Berenschot (2015) has recently
argued, drawing on a comparison of India and Indonesia, there is nothing
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intrinsic to patronage distribution that requires parties to play the central role.
Berenschot (2015) sketches out a typology of brokers, which we build upon
and adapt here. Although this list is not exhaustive, based on previous Indone-
sian research we can speculate that at least four categories of brokers might
be important. First, as in much of the world, are party brokers—though, as
already noted, in Indonesia personal networks and informal ‘success teams’
are often more important. Second, success team members are often tokoh
masyarakat (community leaders or notables)—such as religious or adat (cus-
tomary) leaders—who exercise social influence by way of informal social ties
and functions. We might think of such individuals as constituting community
brokers. Much of the literature on Indonesian electoral politics emphasizes
the role of such actors: Aspinall (2014b:551) refers to Indonesian success teams
as ‘social network machines’; Allen (2012:122) writes of ‘the relative power of
prominent local notables’ in Indonesian politics. A third category are state
brokers, such as bureaucrats or low-level elected officials; for reasons we shall
explore below, political candidates throughout Indonesia are keen todraw such
actors into their success teams (Berenschot 2015; Tans 2012). Finally, though
this category does not exhaust the list, wemight also identifymarket brokers—
individuals such as landlords, plantation owners, construction contractors, dis-
tributors, or other entrepreneurswhose influence is derived from the economic
dependence that tenants, employees, sub-contractors, and others may have on
them.While candidates’ wealth and other endowments will greatly affect their
abilities to recruit brokers of any sort, themix of brokers that occurs in any par-
ticular election campaign is likely to strongly reflect the patronage strategies
adopted by candidates.
In sum, though clearly patronage counts in Indonesian electoral politics, the
literature so far has largely been reliant on case studymethods that are lesswell
suited to testing under what circumstances patronage is most effective, what
forms of patronage predominate, and how it might be affected by variants of
brokerage. In the research summarized in this article, we experimented with a
different approach, by lowering our focus of analysis from the macro level of
candidates and their campaigns to the meso or village level. We studied just
one election: the 2013 bupati race in Tanah Laut District (see Map 1). In that
regard our approach accords with the case study analysis that has hitherto
predominated. However, candidates and core campaign organizers were not
our central focus, though we did interview them where possible. Instead, our
unit of analysis was the villages, precisely because candidates recorded highly
varied results at this level (maps 2 and 3). We wanted to explore the reasons
for this patchwork of results and, specifically, to examine whether variation
in patronage distribution and brokerage contributed to it. To our knowledge,
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no study has taken a single election and systematically analysed the role of
patronage delivery in producing such varied outcomes.1
So how did our research proceed? As already mentioned, we sent a team of
researchers to interview community leaders in a sample of 36 of the 135 villages
in the district. Our researchers interviewed a total of 342 informants. We chose
a mixture of villages. Twenty were villages where three of the four bupati can-
didates had won with their largest percentages (ten villages where the winner
achieved the highest percentage of the vote, eight won by the second-placed
candidate, and two villages won by the third; the fourth candidate did not
win the highest vote in any village and we disregarded him). In addition, 16
villages were selected at random from across the nine subdistricts in Tanah
Laut.
In our interviews, we specifically targeted village elites, such as village heads
and other village officials, party activists, religious leaders, midwives and other
health workers, teachers, and other informal community leaders (tokoh
masyarakat), precisely because our understanding is that such actors often act
as vote brokers in the success teams that mobilize voters and deliver cash or
goods to them at election times. Our researchers used semi-structured inter-
views to identify the key electoral actors in these villages, the strategies they
used, and the forms of patronage delivered, as well as these village elites’ per-
ceptions of the reasons for the election outcome in their village. To ensure
balanced information we made a strong effort to interview individuals who
supported more than a single candidate (though this proved difficult in some
villageswhere support was strongly concentrated on just one candidate). Over-
all, this research strategy proved effective and we were able to turn up a wealth
of details about patronage, clientelistic exchange, and network-building during
the election.
The Setting: Tanah Laut
The election, held on 25 April 2013, pitted the son of the incumbent bupati
(district head) of Tanah Laut against the incumbent’s deputy and two other
1 The nearest thing to that attempted here is the excellent study of the 2006 pilkada in Aceh
conducted by Clark and Palmer (2008:37–9), which notes that variation in voting outcomes
across villageswas often related todealsmadebetween candidates andvillage elders, by those
elders’ calculations about which candidate would deliver greater benefits to the village, and
by personal rewards they could gain.
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figure 1 Tanah Laut location. © The Australian National University. cartogis 14-037 kd.
candidates. In a closely fought contest, the son, Bambang Alamsyah, won with
a narrow margin of 60,573 votes, or 40.7% of the total, beating his nearest
rival, Atmari, with 57,348 votes or 38.5%. As with many such elections of local
government heads, however,wenoted significant variation in community-level
voting patterns.
Tanah Laut is in many ways a rather typical corner of an undistinguished
Indonesian province. As with South Kalimantan Province as a whole, the pop-
ulation of the district (308,000 in 2012) is largely rural, with only 22% living
in the one sizeable town, the district capital Pelaihari. Agricultural production
is dominated by rice and corn, with a number of secondary crops. There is
a sizeable plantation sector, with large, commercial oil palm estates, but also
some smallholders growing oil palm and rubber. More unusually, there is also
significant mining—mostly coal but also some iron ore and other minerals—
concentrated in the eastern subdistrict of Kintap. Large, private companies
dominate, but there is significant small-scale artisanal (and largely illegal)min-
ing.
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Local politics in South Kalimantan is also typical of most Indonesian prov-
inces: there is the usual fragmented political party map, andmost elected local
government heads are former bureaucrats (in early 2015, nine of the 13 bupati
andmayors in the provinces were former civil servants). The province is distin-
guished, however, by its wealth of resources, being the third-largest area of coal
production in the country. As a result, much political life centres on resource
rent-seeking, with bureaucrats, politicians, security officials, and others seek-
ing access to mining permits and the opportunities for official revenues and
illicit payments these provide. Several local mining magnates exercise major
influenceon local politics in theprovince, bothdirectly by leading several of the
major political parties or heading district governments, or indirectly by spon-
soring political candidates (Susanto 2007; Morishita 2011). With Tanah Laut
being the third-largest coal-producing district in the province, with a little over
19million tons of production in 2011 (bps 2012:231), and having significant unex-
ploited reserves, the political economy of mining became an important part of
the backdrop of the election discussed in this article.
The post of bupatiwas held between 2003 and 2013 by Adriansyah, a bureau-
crat who first became prominent through a position in Bartamara, a local gov-
ernment company with mining interests based in the neighbouring district
of Banjar. In this regard also Tanah Laut was not unusual, reflecting the con-
tinuing dominance by former bureaucrats in local elected office throughout
Indonesia, though in Adriansyah’s case his access to mining funds must have
made him particularly well resourced. It is widely understood that through
his position Adriansyah built up a war chest which he then used to buy sup-
port from the local council for the election in 2003. For much of his decade
in office, Adriansyah operated as a typical patronage politician, with control
of palm oil and mining licenses in his district being a major source of funds.
Late in his term he was investigated, and subsequently charged, for a bribery
case involving the issuing of a mining license to a local businessman who
subsequently became mayor of Banjarmasin, the provincial capital. In April
2015, after the research upon which this article was based, he was arrested
by the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Corruption Eradication Comission) in
a hotel in Bali while allegedly in the midst of transacting a us$50,000 bribe
concerning a mining operation in Tanah Laut. Yet Adriansyah was also locally
regarded as an effective government leader. In particular, he supported a pro-
gramme of agricultural development and assistance to farmers’ groups, and
prioritized rural infrastructure. For example, the length of asphalted district
roads increased from 361km in 2003 to 641km over his two terms, while the
proportion of district roads classed as being in a ‘good’ condition increased
from 46 to 70% (bps 2004:211–2, 2013:251–2). He also developed a political
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base in thePartaiDemokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan (pdi-p, IndonesianDemoc-
racy Party-Struggle), becoming head of the South Kalimantan board of the
party.
When his second term (the maximum allowable) was drawing to a close,
Adriansyah chose anoption that is common in Indonesian local politics: dynas-
tic succession (Buehler 2013). Adriansyah’s son, BambangAlamsyah,was young
and lacking in career achievements before being elected to the district parlia-
ment (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, or dprd) in 2009. However, as the
branch head of pdi-p, the party which achieved the highest vote in the dis-
trict, he automatically became the speaker of the dprd. From this position
he was able to build links with key elites in the district, especially at the vil-
lage level, by officiating at the launch of local development projects (though
his advantageous position alsomade him vulnerable to accusations of dynasty-
building, which informants agreed alienated some voters in the election, espe-
cially in the district capital). Bambang’s running mate was Sukamta, a bureau-
crat and faithful servant of Bambang’s father as head of various local govern-
ment agencies, most recently the Badan Kepegawaian Daerah (bkd, Regional
Public Service Agency) and the Badan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Pemer-
intah Desa (bpmd, Agency for the Empowerment of Village Communities and
Governments). Both positions were strategic: through the former, Sukamta
controlled allocation of bureaucratic positions; through the latter, he allocated
rural-development assistance and regularly interacted with village heads and
other rural elites.
Bambang’s main rival in the election was his father’s deputy, Atmari. A per-
sonal note was thus added to the rivalry in this election, though one which
is very common in Indonesian elections, where local government heads often
face off against their deputies in second-termelections. Atmari andAdriansyah
had long worked closely together in the bureaucracy, and (according to infor-
mants close to the two men) during his first term, Adriansyah had promised
Atmari that he would eventually support him as his successor. Atmari thus
viewed Adriansyah’s decision to back his son as a betrayal. As relations wors-
ened between them, according to many sources, Atmari was excluded from
government decisions and access to programmes. This may partly explain why
he chose as his running mate a wealthy but uncharismatic figure, Muhammad
Nur, the son of Haji Abidin, a mining magnate and head of the South Kaliman-
tan branch of the Gerindra party. Other candidates who threw their hats in the
ring were never considered serious contenders: Abdul Wahid (who attained
15%of the vote)was another former bureaucrat and head of the district branch
of pan (Partai Amanat Nasional), while Amperansyah (6%) was an indepen-
dent candidate.
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figure 2 Election Results: Bambang. © The Australian National University.
cartogis 14-037 kd.
The candidates were nominated and campaigns progressed, according to a
pattern thatwill be familiar to students of local elections in Indonesia (formore
detailed accounts of theway party coalitions are assembled, seeMietzner 2009,
2010). Bambang was nominated by pdi-p and the Golkar party, while Atmari
was backed by a coalition of smaller parties. As is typical, the candidates had
to pay for these nominations (according to an informant close to the Atmari
camp, Bambang paid 17 billion rupiah (about us$1.7 million) to purchase the
support of Golkar, while the parties who nominated Atmari were paid a total of
around 40 billion, or us$4 million) (we were not able to verify these amounts
with the candidates concerned). However, each candidate could not rely on
these parties to campaign wholeheartedly for them, and instead constructed
ad hoc ‘success teams’ (Aspinall 2014b). These teams in turn recruited large
numbers of coordinators, intermediaries, and brokers in every subdistrict and,
where possible, every village. As noted above, however, the results achieved
by these teams varied greatly. Even neighbouring villages sometimes voted
very differently.Moreover, these variations did not correlatewith differences in
ethnic composition, income levels, or livelihoods. Although the largest ethnic
group in Tanah Laut is the local Banjar, there are also significant populations
of Javanese and Madurese transmigrants, as well as Bugis along the coasts.
We found that these ethnic differences had no appreciable impact on voting
patterns. How, then, do we explain the variation? Below, we lay out the main
findings of our village-level investigations.
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figure 3 Election Results: Atmari. © The Australian National University.
cartogis 14-037c kd.
Projects and Pork
While the winner was assisted by his father’s record of promoting agricul-
tural development, this history of achievement was strongly backed by—and
entwined with—patronage. In 90% of the villages won by Bambang that we
surveyed, he and his father had targeted delivery of development assistance
in the weeks and months leading up to the election, using both formal gov-
ernment programmes and private donations. They distributed benefits, most
commonly hand tractors, seedlings, and fertilizer to farmers’ cooperatives (in
the terms introduced above, club goods) and road repairs and other small-
scale infrastructure to beneficiary villages (pork barrel projects). Bambang was
also greatly advantaged by his father’s position as incumbent and his ability to
call upon village officials (notably village heads) to mobilize voters, a point we
return to below. In sum, this was a state-centred campaign of a sort that has
been described by Tans (2012:10) as characteristic of local ‘mafias’ which ‘con-
trol local state institutions’.
In one sense, it is not surprising that what was in effect the campaign of
an incumbent would stress local development achievements, given that the
development of their region is, in effect, the major programmatic goal of any
local leader in Indonesia. However, a large body of literature (especially from
Latin America) points to how government ‘programmes’ are often subverted
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to meet clientelist purposes and handed out in part with an expectation of
reciprocity: schemes are devised to ensure that supporters of the government
leader or ruling party benefit disproportionately and/or with an implicit (or
sometimes explicit) expectation that programme beneficiaries will reward the
governing party or coalition with their votes (see, for example, Diaz-Cayeros,
Estévez, and Magaloni 2012; Manor 2013). A similar blending of programmatic
politics with clientelist delivery is common in Indonesia, and was pronounced
in the Tanah Laut election.
The memory of Adriansyah’s term as bupati, especially his agricultural
achievements, strongly contributed to Bambang’s victory. In a large number
of the villages that our team visited informants attributed the overall outcome
to his father’s development achievements and to hopes that Bambang would
continue those efforts. This was especially the case in the subdistricts of Kurau
and Bumi Makmur, which are rice-growing areas located about 40km from
the district capital. As a result of concerted development programmes over the
last decade, featuring improved immigration, technical assistance, and aid to
farmers’ groups (including provision of improved varieties, hand tractors, and
subsidized fertilizer), in much of this rice belt farmers had increased their har-
vests from once to twice a year, greatly improving their income.
But Bambang (and his father) did not passively rely on this record to sell
itself. During his campaign, Bambang claimed that he personally visited 96 out
of the district’s 135 villages (he claimed he lost in only one of the villages he vis-
ited, though our team found others). According to his own account, he would
tailor what he said on these visits to prior surveys of village needs conducted
by teammembers. Instead of making general promises, he would say ‘very spe-
cific things in response to their needs […] here is the programme, here is the
money’.2 Our informants also told us that Bambang’s father, while still bupati,
often accompanied Bambang on these visits or invited his son to functions
where agricultural assistance was being distributed or development projects
being launched. These eventswerememorable formany local residents. In par-
ticular, Bambang had a reputation for getting his hands dirty by working in the
fields alongside farmers on such occasions. Although these were presumably
stage-managed events, they had a strong impact, contributing to Bambang’s
man-of-the-people image, despite his elite background.
Especially important were the targeted assistance packages that were dis-
bursed on these visits. These came in two forms. The firstwas clubs goods in the
form of gifting of agricultural equipment (typically, hand tractors) and seeds,
2 Interview with Bambang Alamsyah, 18-12-2014.
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seedlings, and fertilizer to farmers’ groups. These assistance programmes were
especially important in Kurau andBumiMakmur subdistricts, where they rein-
forced Adriansyah’s previous record of agricultural development and where
Bambang won with 43 and 46% of the vote respectively. The second form of
largesse was pork barrel projects in the form of small-scale village infrastruc-
ture projects, typically the repair, asphalting, or widening of village roads, but
also the building of facilities such as village halls, gates, fences, sports fields,
and the like.
In nine out of the ten villages where Bambang received his highest vote
(in each of these villages he received over 60% of the vote) we found evi-
dence of strong mobilization of this sort in the months leading up to the poll,
with Bambang and his team visiting these villages and distributing develop-
ment assistance and projects, and local elites ascribing his success to these
efforts (in the one that was an exception, there were other forms of patron-
age distribution—notably vote-buying and an influential local businessman
strongly backing Bambang’s campaign). In eight of the nine villages, too, we
found evidence he was backed by the village head. Moreover, in nine out of the
ten randomly selected villages we visited where Bambang won with a plurality
of voteswealso foundevidenceof suchporkbarrel andclubgoodsmobilization
by Bambang, though oftenwith lower intensity. In contrast, we found evidence
of this strategy in only five of the 16 villages we surveyed where Bambang did
not win. In other words, we found no evidence of such mobilization in 11 of
the 16 villages where Bambang lost, whereas it was absent in only two of the
20 villages where he won. Overall, this was our strongest finding: village devel-
opment projects and targeted agricultural assistance were critical to achieving
political success in this election.
By definition, this strategy is one that is open only to political candidates
who have emerged through the local bureaucracy, and especially to the incum-
bents who control it, and its effectiveness is therefore likely to be one reason
for the continuing hold that former state officials exercise on local politics,
as observed by Buehler and others (it should be noted, too, that legislators
are increasingly trying to be able to use this approach, via discretionary con-
stituency development funds known as dana aspirasi or ‘aspiration funds’; see
Mahsun forthcoming).
According to informants, the distribution of these projects followed a typ-
ical pattern: Bambang would either personally visit a village or send a rep-
resentative, hold a discussion with village leaders, ascertain their needs, and
then invite them to send project proposals to the relevant district govern-
ment agency. He would promise to help them in ensuring a swift and positive
response (of course it was presumably his father, still serving as bupati, who
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was able to ensure positive outcomes). To cite just one example, in the village
of Raden, in Kurau, one informant explained that
Bambang is very extraordinary, his leadership is very good, because in this
village he has built a village hall, an official residence for themidwife, and
has also put in street lighting. But he did this afterwemade proposals that
were submitted to the CommunityWelfare Bureau. Pak Bambang helped
us to get them through the process.
Here, the initial meeting took place well in advance of the election, several
months before Bambang’s candidacy was formally announced. In about half of
the cases, the projects were accelerated and fully implemented prior to voting
day; in about an equal number of cases, the project was either initiated with
a promise it would be completed if Bambang won, or its delivery was made
contingent upon his victory.
Critically,many village elites and voters appreciated this delivery of concrete
improvements in their villages and contrasted it unfavourably with Atmari’s
efforts. One informant, in a village which Bambang won with a large majority,
explained: ‘It was Pak Bambang who promised he would build a road for the
farmers so they could get to their dryland and rice paddies. All we heard from
PakAtmari’s success teamwas his vision andmission [the standard Indonesian
phrase for an election platform] about what his work will be like in the future
and how he wanted to improve the welfare of the poor.’ At least in the view of
village elites, voters wanted tangible benefits.
One important factor that emerges from the above description is the nego-
tiated nature of these interactions, pointing to the important role of agency on
the part of village-level vote brokers. Indeed, in some places, elites were openly
calculating in their approach. In the village of Kait-Kait Baru, village officials
themselves took the initiative to send project proposals to all the candidates,
but they found Bambang’s response to be the most satisfactory:
We sent in a proposal to Bapak Bambang [for assistance in providing
materials with which] the community here could build a fence around
the cemetery and for cement to repair ourmushollah. Everything we sent
to him in the form of proposals was fulfilled by Bapak Bambang. That’s
why he won in our village. We are materialistic. Whoever gives the most,
that’s who we vote for.
This tactic mostly involved politicization of the district’s development proce-
dures, with projects funded out of the government budget. On a few occasions,
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however, our village informants told us the projects were personal gifts from
Bambang and his father, paid out of private funds. While this is not impos-
sible (Bambang made many private gifts of other sorts, as we see below), it
seems equally likely that voters were misapprehending the source of the bene-
fits bestowed upon them (in other words, local government projects were sold
to themas gifts fromBambang andhis father). Thiswas itself an important find-
ing: many of our village elite informants simply did not distinguish between
private and public goods for their villages.
Religious Gifts
As already noted, many analyses of Indonesian politics stress the social-net-
work aspect of local-level campaigning, including the prominent role played
by local religious authorities in connecting candidates to voters. This element
was also all but ubiquitous in Tanah Laut, though it was trumped by the state-
focused mobilization discussed in the preceding section.
A strategy that was used by all candidates, but most assiduously by the
second-placed Atmari, was distribution of club goods to religious institutions
and groups. These gifts—whichwe foundevidenceof in 26out of our 36 sample
villages—came in three forms. The first was donations of sums of money (the
largest we encountered was 25 million rupiah, or about us$2,500) to mosques,
prayer halls (langgar), or religious boarding schools (pesantren) in the villages,
in order to renovate, expand, or improve these facilities. Sometimes cash gifts
were replaced or supplemented by in-kind support, such as sacks of cement.
The second form was the distribution of small gifts, typically headscarves,
sarung, prayer mats, and the like (sometimes combined with small cash gifts)
to congregations at religious meetings attended by candidates. Typically, these
gifts would be distributed after the candidate attended a prayer meeting, often
taking the form of a sholat hajat (a prayer requesting the fulfilment of a wish
or goal, this time electoral victory). A third and final form of religious gift was
the distribution of sacrificial cattle (sapi qurban) to villages at the time of the
annual Idul Adha (Feast of the Sacrifice) festival, an occasion when wealthy
members of the community donate goats, sheep, or cattle to be slaughtered,
cooked, and shared out among the needy and other communitymembers. The
festival had occurred in late October 2012, about six months prior to the elec-
tion, exactly the time when candidates were starting to promote themselves,
prompting an outburst of charitable giving.
The campaign by Atmari was particularly marked by such religious gifting.
In 23 of the 36 villages in our sample we found evidence of Atmari providing
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donations to mosques, prayer halls, and religious schools, and/or distributing
items tomembers of devotional groups.At the same time, in the vastmajority of
villages he visited, he attended a prayer meeting run by a village-level religious
group (formore on these groups, see below). According to one of his supporters
he also gave sapi qurban to ‘hundreds’ of prayer halls throughout the district.3
However, this campaign was not particularly effective: Atmari won the vote in
only ten of the 23 villages where we identified such gift-giving, and lost in the
other 13. Those ten villages were certainly a large proportion of the 14 villages in
our sample thatwerewonbyAtmari; but in all but a couple of these villages our
informants ascribed his victory to other factors. His religious gifting in these
places seemed to reinforce other bonds that he had established, and which
were in themselves the primary explanation for his victory.
Why did Atmari choose this approach, and why was it ineffective? It was
not a case of a distinction between a religious candidate and a more secular
one. According to one of his associates, Atmari did not have a reputation
as being particularly devout prior to the election, instead he ‘only started to
host majelis taklim [religious study groups] at his house as he was thinking of
nominating himself ’ (interview, 27 January 2014). Rather, the key differencewas
in political resources. Atmari’s rival, Bambang, had access to themost powerful
networks in the district. Not only did Bambang’s father, Adriansyah, control the
bureaucracy and was able to mobilize village officials to support his son (see
below), the two strongest political parties in the district, pdi-p and Golkar, also
supported him. In these circumstances, Atmari had few alternative networks
available to him. The political parties which supported his candidacy did so
because they were paid, as noted above, and lacked strong village branches.
Only a few village chiefs supported him.
In these circumstances, Atmari turned to a type of village-level, informal
religious institution that proliferates in South Kalimantan, as in many parts
of Indonesia. Usually called kelompok pengajian or majelis taklim, these are
groups consisting of the more devout people in the village, who meet regu-
larly—typically on Friday evenings—to recite Quranic verses, listen to reli-
gious sermons, or otherwise engage in devotional activity and learning (for one
recent account of majelis taklim, see Winn 2012). Most such gatherings bring
together a few dozen people, typically drawn from older residents. Sometimes
a group will invite a religious expert from a nearby village, or further afield, to
lead the prayers and give a sermon. The groups are often run by an individual
from the village who develops a district-wide or, rarely, province-wide reputa-
3 Interview, 27-1-2014.
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tion for religious knowledge, preaching, and sometimesothermystical abilities,
such as healing, andwho receives invitations to preach elsewhere. Such groups
have multiplied throughout Indonesia over the last decade or so, and are, as
one of our informants put it, often treated as an ‘entry door’ for political can-
didates seeking access to village networks. This seems to have been Atmari’s
approach, in the absence of viable alternative strategies. One of the members
of his campaign team explained it this way:
It was a political strategy. What he did was come to the majelis taklim
in the village and carry out sosialisasi [literally: socialization, that is,
promote his candidacy]. That’s more effective than just giving assistance.
The idea is that from that pengajian they would spread his ideas around
among the other villagers and pass on his appeal. That’s the idea: you visit
the pengajian group and from there it spreads.4
The problem for Atmari, however, was twofold. In the first place, the informal
religious networks were just as open to other candidates as they were to him.
Accordingly, we found evidence of Bambang making donations to religious
institutions and networks in 13 of the 36 villages, including many that were
also supported in this way by Atmari. We interviewed several influential local
kyai (religious scholars) and other religious leaders, who were approached by
several candidates for their blessings, and in several villages local pengajian
groups, mosques, or langgar received donations from two or more candidates.
Several villages likewise received donations of more than one sapi qurban. In
many places, this competitive religious gifting simply cancelled itself out. No
doubt, gifting helped provide candidates with reputations as pious benefactors
of the Islamic community, but it rarely provided a winning edge.
A second problem was that although Atmari often found an appreciative
audience—and votes—among these prayer groups, their members were a
minority in each village. Even if their close relatives voted for Atmari, this was
often insufficient to neutralize other benefits, such as village projects, provided
by Bambang and his father. Atmari, it appears, chose this strategy because he
lackedmore attractive alternatives; not surprisingly, it failed to deliver strongly
for him.
This finding, though based on a single study, potentially has broader impli-
cations for the study of Indonesian politics, where religious networks play a
critical role in electoral politics but have an influence that habitually falls short
4 Interview, 27-1-2014.
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of expectations (evident, for example, in the continuing inability of Islamic
parties to gain a large share of the national vote). The fact that state-centred
patronage so easily trumped distribution through religious networks in this
election suggests that the latter strategy might often be a ‘weapon of the weak’,
a patronage option pursued primarily by politicians who lack access to more
effective, state-based networks. We lack space to explore this proposition fully,
but this might even be one possible explanation for the continuing difficulties
faced by Islamic parties in Indonesian elections.
Vote-Buying
Our researchers also found evidence of vote-buying—the provision of cash
or other gifts (in addition to gifts provided in a religious context, discussed
already) to individual voters—in 22 of the 36 villages. Although these findings
exceeded our expectations, we still need to treat them cautiously given the
notorious difficulties of finding accurate data on this topic. National survey
data show relatively high social acceptability of vote-buying, but the practice is
illegal, and accusations of vote-buying by Bambang’s camp had been a focus of
aMahkamahKonstitusi (Constitutional Court) challenge by Atmari a couple of
months before our field research. Someof the village eliteswe interviewedwere
likely themselves involved in vote-buying efforts and thus had an incentive
to downplay its significance. It is thus possible that some of the 14 villages
where we found no evidence of vote-buying were false negatives, and that our
informants also understated the extent and impact of the practice when we
did find it. Indeed, in the few cases where our initial research failed to turn
up a strong explanation for an outcome, we revisited the village in question,
interviewed different informants, and found evidence of vote-buying.
With this caveat in mind, our findings are nevertheless revealing in three
critical respects. The first concerns the patchiness of the vote-buying effort.
Although, as explained above, both leading candidates were wealthy, there
was no clear regional pattern. In exactly half (11) of the villages where we
found vote-buying, it was conducted by just one candidate; elsewhere, two
or more participated. We found evidence of vote-buying by candidates in
villages where that candidate was already strong (for instance, because of
family ties), in villages where no candidate had a strong claim, and in villages
that were strongholds of rivals. Moreover, in most villages where vote-buying
occurred only part of the population received payments. Amounts distributed
to villagers also varied (informants spoke of sumsof between 25,000, 50,000 and
100,000 rupiah, roughly us$2.50 to us$10).
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Second, this patchiness was apparently related to difficulties candidates
faced in choosing trustworthy and reliable brokers. As already alluded to, this
problem is recognized in the comparative literature: in order to effectively buy
the vote, candidates need to choose intermediaries with local networks and
influence who can back the delivery of cash with intimate knowledge of the
recipients; such people, however, often have interests that diverge from the
candidate, including in keeping a proportion of the funds for themselves. In
Tanah Laut, the candidates called on various persons to fulfil these brokerage
roles during vote-buying: village officials, religious leaders, health and educa-
tionworkers, village youths, party activists, and so on. But, again, Bambang had
a structural advantage. His father’s incumbency meant his vote-buying effort
could be built around the category we have called ‘state brokers’, specifically
village heads, who are typically the most influential figures in the villages. The
Constitutional Court case prepared by Atmari’s team provides insights into
how Bambang’s campaign was organized in this regard (see below). Atmari’s
efforts were more ad hoc, and in at least several villages he lacked access to
influential local figures. Thus, some village informants reported instances of
outsiders turning up and handing out cash and gifts along with requests to
support Atmari; all agreed that such efforts were ineffective because recipi-
ents did not feel at all obliged to carry their promises through at the ballot
box.
In all but two of the 11 villages we identified where only one candidate
engaged in vote-buying, it was that candidatewhowon. In a handful of villages,
informants readily told us that voters were cash-sensitive and voted for who-
ever paid them. Usually, however, cash gifts were most effective when backed
by other factors that gave the candidate an edge in that village, such as support
of a local notable or a major project or donation.
A third finding, perhaps most unexpected of all, was that vote-buying itself
was also—in about half a dozen villages—counterproductive. This was not,
however, because voters were hostile to the practice. Rather, they reacted
against it when they believed it was being carried out unfairly. In several
villages, brokers evidently did not distribute all or part of the money they
were expected to pass on to the voters. We have direct evidence of this in
only one village, where a village head cheerfully admitted that he spent the
15 million rupiah given to him by Bambang’s campaign for voters on other
purposes: 10 million to repair a village road, and 5 million for a drinking party
for village youths. In other places, informants told us that they had heard that
money had been ‘passed down’ to a village success team member but was
then not distributed onward, or only distributed to people who were related
to, or lived close to, the person concerned. In some places, teammembers were
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seen as profiting handsomely from such embezzlement—in one village they
bought newmotorcycles.
Intriguingly, in most of these cases informants told us that such manipu-
lation made the village swing against the candidate concerned, as a form of
protest at the greed of his brokers. This occurred in the village where Bam-
bang recorded his highest vote; according to one informant, Bambang’s team
distributed the relatively small sum of 25,000 rupiah to most voters there:
‘Although it was small, what’s important is that everybody got the same. This
wasbetter than it beingbig, but allweheardwas thedistant thunder.’ This infor-
mant was referring to the fact that a village elder was believed to have received
a large sum from Atmari, but did not distribute it. In such places, informants
blamed candidates for choosing the ‘wrong people’ for their teams or choosing
people whowere not ‘efficient’, ‘effective’, or ‘trustworthy’. Such reactions point
to awidermoral economy surrounding vote-buying, in which distributing cash
or other gifts is not only seen as a positive attribute of a generous leader, but
where fairness in delivery is also regarded as a mark of that leader’s integrity
and competence. It is not only that candidates need brokers tomake patronage
strategies work, but also that poor-quality brokers could make those strategies
backfire badly.
Vote Brokers
The candidates’ ability to connect to local networks and influential brokerswas,
accordingly, an important factor in explaining many village results. In about
a quarter of our villages, informants pointed to either a family tie with the
candidate or a single prominent local figure as being critical in swaying the
vote. More broadly, the brokerage patternmatched closely onto the patterns of
patronage distribution we have already identified.
State brokers were especially associated—not surprisingly—with the state-
centred strategy employed by Bambang. He was much advantaged in his net-
working by his ability to mobilize civil servants and, especially, village heads.
It is not unusual in local-government head elections in Indonesia for incum-
bents to turn the bureaucracy into an electoral machine. As Tans (2012:24)
notes, in such cases ‘[t]he primary tool for manipulating the bureaucracy [is]
the executive’s right to reassign civil servants’. Throughout Indonesia, it is com-
mon for incumbentdistrict heads to transfer civil servants topostings in remote
locations, or in less well-funded institutions, if they do not support the incum-
bent’s re-election effort. We heard many anecdotes of this technique being
used in Tanah Laut, and Bambang’s ease in delivering projects to villages in
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the months leading up to the election demonstrates that he was able to put
his father’s continuing hold over the bureaucracy to good electoral use. Espe-
cially significant in voter mobilization was Bambang’s—or more to the point,
his father’s—ability to mobilize village heads. Village heads in Indonesia are
elected, and are therefore less vulnerable to being dismissed or reassigned
by a district head than civil servants. However, they are often connected by
informal patron-client ties to the incumbent, and their ability to access vil-
lage development projects and assistance programmes depends on their abil-
ity to foster good relations with him or her.5 Their ability to represent the
village and speak on its behalf in negotiations with candidates over projects
that will benefit the community as a whole, as the discussion above indi-
cates, alsomakes them especially influential as vote brokers. Part of their effec-
tiveness, meanwhile, comes from the discretionary power they have when it
comes to determining which village residents get access to government pro-
grammes: for example, they issue letters that determine whether poorer res-
idents are eligible to various cash transfer and subsidy schemes (Berenschot
2015; Mulyadi 2013). As a result, villagers are especially liable to listen to their
directives.
Accordingly, village heads were critical to Bambang’s success in some vil-
lages. As already noted, they backed Bambang’s candidacy in most of the
villages where he ran a successful state-based patronage campaign empha-
sizing pork barrel projects and agricultural development. But village heads
were not only involved in brokering deals about club goods and pork barrel
projects, they also played a critical role in vote-buying. The documentation
of Atmari’s unsuccessful Constitutional Court challenge contains much rele-
vant detail, including testimony from one village head that he took part in
a meeting with ten others in the official residence of Adriansyah, who gave
each of them 12.5 million rupiah (around us$1200) and told them to distribute
it to residents and direct them to vote for his son (Mahkamah Konstitusi
2013:26).
Village heads were not the only network resource candidates could draw
upon. Variations in village-election results in Indonesia often result from can-
didates’ local ties (Clark and Palmer 2008:37); accordingly, in a number of
villages (six out of our sample of 36) a candidate did well because of fam-
ily connections. The third-placed candidate, Abdul Wahid, won only in two
villages: Kuringkit, near where he grew up and where his brother had been
village head, and Muara Asam-Asam, where many of his wife’s family lived.
5 For an analysis of the power of village heads and other village elites, see Ito 2011.
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He came a close second in Tabanio village, where his wife was from (in each
place he reinforced these ties with regular visits and donations). Bambang also
had local relatives, several holding village government positions, and he won
in all such villages we encountered. Atmari, born in East Java, lacked local
family ties, but in some places those of his running mate compensated for
this: he received one of his highest results, just over 60%, in Sungai Pinang
village, the birthplace of Haji Abidin, Muhammad Nur’s father, and a place
where Haji Abidin owned a large rubber plantationwhich employedmany res-
idents.
Party brokers were named as playing a significant role in village-level cam-
paigns in about half (17) of our villages, which figure was higher than we had
expected. But their role was generally secondary to village heads and other vil-
lage elites, and they tended to be foot soldiers rather than key power brokers.
One exception was in Takisung Subdistrict, one of only two won by Atmari,
where Amtari was much assisted by a member of the district parliament, Abdi
Rahman, a resident of the village of Ranggang (one of our randomly selected
villages) who had a reputation for helping residents in need. Switching from a
minor party to Muhammad Nur’s Gerindra in the 2014 legislative election, he
threw his influence behind the Atmari–Nur campaign. Although informants
in two villages said that his endorsement was itself important, it was exercised
alongside vote-buying: a series of sholat hajatwere run in 12 villages in the sub-
district, to pray for Atmari’s victory, and residents who attended each received
50,000 rupiah.
This example points to the importance of supra-village power brokers: indi-
viduals whose influence extended over more than one village, and sometimes
over an entire subdistrict. Many such individuals were market brokers: local
entrepreneurs whose political influence was directly connected to their eco-
nomic power. For example, in the village of Sungai Bakar, Bajuin Subdistrict,
where Atmari won over 60% of the vote, a wealthy local businesswoman was
in charge of a scheme where locals who collected 100 photocopies of id cards
of voters who pledged to vote for Atmari were paid 2,000,000 rupiah (around
us$200). Bambang, too, could call on local connections. For example, in the
coal-mining subdistrict of Kintap (the only subdistrict where he won an abso-
lute majority of the vote, albeit narrowly with 51%) he was greatly assisted by
Haji Ibus, a wealthy local businessman, pdi-p politician, and long-time asso-
ciate ofAdriansyah.Describedby informants inhis homevillageofKintapKecil
(one of our selection of ten villages where Bambang recorded his highest vote)
as being in equal measure respected (in part for a history of generous dona-
tions to religious institutions and community activities) and feared (in part for
running a network of toughs, whomhe used to assert control in the rough-and-
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tumble of the local mining industry), Haji Ibus was critical to the success of
Bambang’s campaign in the subdistrict. Although such figures turned up only
a few times in our study, when they did, they generally turned out to be espe-
cially influential.
Community brokers, by contrast, appeared in virtually every village success
team, but often failed to carry decisive weight on their own. In every village
we studied, informants spoke of religious leaders, youth leaders, and the ubiq-
uitous tokohmasyarakat—meaning here, roughly, village elders—as being the
key actors in success teams. As already discussed, coordinators of majelis tak-
lim and other religious leaders were targeted by all candidates, but especially
by Atmari, as brokers for club goods directed at religious congregations, but
they rarely succeeded in swinging the votes of an entire village in the desired
direction. Even so, therewere a fewplaceswhere a religious leader commanded
great respect: the village of Mekar Sari in Kintap Subdistrict went to Atmari
because it was the home of an influential religious leader and paranormal, Haji
Sutomo, who also headed the local Gerindra party chapter and who facilitated
amajor donation from the Atmari camp for the villagemosque. In Alur village,
Haji Mukri, a famous religious leader in charge of a pesantren, swung this vil-
lage to a 67% vote for Atmari.
If local-leadership connections counted at the subdistrict and village level,
they could also be influential at the sub-village level. Although not our focus,
our field researchers often picked up stories indicating that voting patterns
varied significantly within a single village, with very different outcomes in dif-
ferent polling stations (typically there were between two and four of these in
a village). Sometimes the pattern was that residents who lived close to the vil-
lage head voted for Bambang, but those who lived near a local religious leader
leaned toward Atmari. But this was not a consistent pattern, with everything
depending on the personal connections linking village notables and candi-
dates.
An intriguing example was the village of Handil Babirik in Bumi Makmur,
which was won narrowly by Atmari, unlike most villages in this subdistrict.
Here, the villageheadwas strongly in theAtmari camp:he received twovehicles
from the Atmari campaign for use by the village government in the several
months leading up to the election (they were returned after Atmari lost; the
understanding was that he would have kept them had Atmari won), and he
testified for Atmari at the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, Atmari carried
two polling stations in the part of the village where the village head and most
of his relatives lived; the other two polling stations went to Bambang, with
residents being grateful for hand tractors and other gifts distributed in the run
up to the election.
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Time and again, we found our informants mapping results at the sub-village
level in this way: explaining varying polling-station results by pointing to an
influential individual who lived in a particular neighbourhood, and/or by
pointing to neighbourhood variations in experiences of vote-buying and gift-
giving. Our focus on village rather than sub-village variation does not allow us
to explore such neighbourhood clientelism in detail; it does, however, suggest
it would be a potentially rewarding topic for future study.
Finally it should benoted, in keepingwith our earlier observations, that local
community leaders andbrokers oftenhad considerable autonomy indetermin-
ing which candidates they wanted to support. In some cases, local leaders had
long-standing clientelistic relations with one of the candidates. In others, our
informants recalled how village heads and other community leaders had care-
fullyweighedupwhich candidate offered the greatest advantages for the village
and directed voters accordingly, a phenomenon that has been observed else-
where in Indonesia (Clark andPalmer 2008:37–9) aswell as in other parts of the
developing world (for instance, Krishna 2007:148). We have alreadymentioned
one villagewhere officials sent project proposals to all candidates, and directed
residents to vote for Bambang when he responded most generously. This was
an extreme case, but inmany of the placeswhere Bambang andhis father deliv-
ered or promised village improvements prior to the election, it is evident that
village leaders consulted with residents, determined that they would benefit
most if Bambang was elected, and made their preference known. Thus, in the
village of Tirta Jaya one village official explained that ‘[i]t was the village appa-
ratuswhich itself took the initiative to choose a pair [Bambang and his running
mate Sukamta] and [then we] directed and coordinated the residents [so they
would vote accordingly]’. They did, so afterwards Sukamta visited the village
and acceded to the elders’ request to provide heavy machinery to enable them
to enlarge the village cemetery. Wemight think of such instances as represent-
ing a formof consensual voting,mediatedby state brokers.Not surprisingly, this
pattern will tend to confer a strong incumbency and bureaucracy advantage in
local electoral races.
Conclusion: A Patchwork Politics
The study presented here is far from being the final word on patronage politics
in Indonesia. It has clear limits, most obviously those that derive from it being
based on a single district. Nevertheless, we hope we have demonstrated that
meso-level studies of village-level results and networks are one way of further-
ing the study of patronage politics, not least because they focus at the interme-
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diate level in patronage chainswhere the success or failure of patronagepolitics
is typically determined. They also allow us to get beyond broad generalizations
about the power of patronage tomore precise evaluations about what varieties
of patronage are most effective and under what conditions.
Our approach confirmed that the 2013 district head election in Tanah Laut,
like so many in Indonesia, was a poll in which patronage was king. As we
have seen, the patchwork of varied village-level results obtained by the leading
candidates can largely be explained by variations in the patronage benefits—
whether collective or individual—they provided in those locations. More
specifically, our study higlights the critical role of brokerage. In rural Indonesia,
patchy electoral outcomes of the sort we have analysed in this article are com-
monplace. This is because electoral competitions in such circumstances are
not merely straightforward contests of financial power in which the wealthiest
candidates win, but contests in which candidates require effective networks of
brokers to deliver these benefits and ensure that the beneficiaries reciprocate
with their votes. Gifts provided by candidates to villagers might not be viewed
as binding unless they are backed up by the words of a locally authoritative
community leader. As Clark and Palmer (2008:39) observe, ‘the voiced opin-
ions of the high status members of society’ can carry influence in Indonesian
elections, and many voters are ‘strongly guided by the opinions of neighbors
and especially the guidance of village elders’.
But if brokers are critical to electoral success, this does notmean that all bro-
kers are equally effective.Oneof ourmain findings concerns howdifficult it can
be for candidates to find reliable intermediaries. In many villages, candidates
lacked agents they could trust to deliver cash or gifts. Voter perceptions that
brokers were hoarding such material rather than distributing it backfired on
some candidates, accounting for poor support in some villages.We are left with
an inescapable image of how unevenly electoral influence can be distributed,
and how imperfectly a campaign strategy can be executed, even when the can-
didates are wealthy and powerful on the local scene.
However, we are far from suggesting that power resource views of Indone-
sian local politics are redundant. As it turned out, overshadowing all the sub-
tleties of this election campaign were the brute facts of incumbency and
bureaucratic mobilization. What gave the victor his winning edge were state-
centred forms of patronage and assiduous networking with a group we have
described (following Berenschot 2015) as state brokers, especially village heads.
By utilizing the resources of the local government to provide targeted develop-
ment projects and other benefits, and by relying on village heads to mediate
and provide their blessings for such deals, Bambang and his father seized vic-
tory, in the face of accusations they were establishing a local dynasty. Other
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scholars have observed the frequency with which local government elections
arewonby contestantswith backgrounds in the local bureaucracy, and stressed
that such victories are one by-product of the fusion of state and economic
power that continues to characterize Indonesia’s post-Suharto elite. This study
has demonstrated some of the techniques by which that fusion is achieved.
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